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or of the imagination; the latter type being peculiarly divorced from action. Action may arise directly from stimuli in the senses; or indirectly from the states of mind evoked by sensations; or again from states of mind called out by memory or by imagination. This partial agreement of effects does not imply an identity of the causes involved in them.

Neither do we find that that which paralyzes the organ of sense necessarily and immediately destroys the power to imagine objects which enter through that sense. A deaf Beethoven can compose music, a blind Milton, blind by disease of the nerve, can write an epic. That there should be a slow decay of the imagination in connection with the early loss of a sense is natural, almost inevitable. The requisite material ceases to be presented to the mind; present possessions, impressions, fade out, and the objects of the remaining senses usurp the place of the lost sense. The doctrine, as stated above, would require that blindness, when an affection of the nerve, should be followed by the instant and entire loss of the images of visible objects. The facts signally contradict the theory, and the theory fails. The blind man deals with all the imagery of the eye, walks the streets, and uses, to the full, the language of vision. Indeed, in the strict form in which it is stated, this dogma approaches an absurdity. If I imagine a visual object on the retina of the eye, " in the same manner " in which I see it, my imagination should be confined to the open eye, and be identical with the impression of objects actually seen. Otherwise it must be conceded, that in one case the agency affecting the retina acts from without, and in the other from within, in itself a grave difference. The imagination of feelings, tastes, odors, should also be as clear and decisive as the conception of the objects of sight. Quite the reverse is true, a fact entirely intelligible on the ground