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flat surface formed by those finger-ends, an impression of touch could be given to a certain number of them a number great in proportion to the size of the thing. And if two things successively laid upon them, differed not only in size but in shape, there would be a difference not only in the number of the finger-ends affected, but also in the kind of combination. But now, what would be the interpretation of any impression thus produced, while, as yet, no experiences had been accumulated? Would there be any idea of extension? I think not. To simplify the question, let the first object laid on these finger-ends, be a straight stick; and let us name the two finger-ends on which its extremes lie, A and Z. If now it be said that the length of the stick will be perceived, it is implied that the distance between A and Z is already known, or, in other words, that there is a pre-existent idea of a special extension, which is absurd. If it be said that the extension is implied by the simultaneous excitation of B, C, D, E, F, and all the fingers between A and Z, the difficulty is not escaped; for no idea can arise from the simultaneous excitement of these, unless there is a knowledge of their relative positions; which is itself a knowledge of extension. By what process, then, can the length of the stick become known? It can become known only after the accumulation of certain experiences, by which the series and fingers between A and Z become known. If the whole mass of fingers admits of being moved bodily, as the retina does; and if by virtue of its movements, something now touched by finger A is next touched by finger B, next by C, and so on; and if these experiences are so multiplied by motions in all directions, that between the touching by finger A and by any other finger, the number of intermediate touches that will be felt is known; then the distance between A and Z can be known known, that is, as a series