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of an independent explanatory notion, the phenomena would be complete and intelligible in themselves. The sequence of events provokes the notion, but is not that notion. Sequence and time do not mutually contain each other, but (1) time is that idea without which the fact of sequence is unintelligible. That time is not identical with succession is seen in our measurement of it. (2) A succession of events may be completed in a shorter or longer period, and if time to us were their mere relation in sequence, we should insist on its identity in the two cases. (3) We distinguish time from any given sequence, indeed from all sequences, longer or shorter according to the forces at work. We do not identify it with that series of events even by which we measure it. The conditions for its exact estimate and general apprehension are different. (4) The notion of time, with no actual events transpiring in it, is quite consonant with thought. Moreover, many sequences are simultaneous. (5) The relativity of which one of these is it that constitutes time? It cannot be one to the exclusion of the remainder, for no one has such a pre-eminence over every other. Neither can it be all, since they are constantly varying among themselves. What effect has it on time, that one drives faster than he has been driving, that a railroad train has stopped at a station, that the thoughts have been quickened by danger? The quality of sweetness may exist in many things, and have shades of diversity in each; is this also oar conception of time?

(6) The prior notion of time, moreover, imposes sequence, when there is no sequence in the states of consciousness, but rather alternation. The mind may pass from A to B in contemplation, and back again; it may vibrate between the two in alternate thought: yet it does this as certainly under the idea of time as if it had simply passed on to Z. Motion in a circle is felt to be motion as much